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Abstract 
This article examines the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons, which has reinvigorated 
the efforts to achieve their prohibition. It explores the fundamental arguments made by the 
“Humanitarian Initiative” and their grounding in a relationship between international law and 
international politics. The analysis draws on the emphasis that classical realists put on the 
political nature of international problems, primarily shaped by considerations of power. Such 
approach is useful because the humanitarian approach attempts to address the political 
problem of nuclear weapons by recourse to claims about morality and through the means of 
international law, most notably the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), 
deliberately choosing to circumvent politics and its concern with power. The classical realist 
perspective suggests that to overlook the power political dimension and to consider the 
problem of nuclear weapons chiefly as a moral and legal issue is likely to lead to yet another 
failure in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
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One of the key defining features of the nuclear condition is the persistent inability to actually 
do away with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the nuclear condition itself must be defined with 
reference to their existence. There is a wider view that sees the nuclear condition as a product 
of the knowledge about nuclear weapons, knowledge that can never be lost. In this broader 
sense, the nuclear condition is permanent because these weapons cannot be disinvented, 
though their impact on humanity and politics can be reimagined (van Munster and Sylvest, 
2016). Irrespective of whether one subscribes to this broader position or not, so long as 
nuclear weapons remain in someone’s possession, the nuclear condition cannot be argued 
away. It continues to be humanity’s condition. The lack of any meaningful progress on the 
way to nuclear disarmament and abolition is remarkable, because there has been no shortage 
 2 
 
2 
of attempts to achieve it.1 What is more, it is a frequently proclaimed goal and a widely 
shared ambition among various political leaders. And yet, efforts to rid the world of nuclear 
weapons have failed time and again. 
 
The failure to address the nuclear condition in a way that would provide a more satisfactory 
solution than the reliance on a fragile and potentially catastrophic balance of terror inherent to 
nuclear deterrence has not gone unnoticed by those disturbed by the existence of nuclear 
weapons. In recent years, a substantial group of actors, comprising of states and their 
representatives as well as many in the global civil society, have reinvigorated their efforts 
around what has come to be known as the humanitarian approach.2 It draws on the idea that 
nuclear weapons with their awesome destructive power are a common problem shared by all 
human beings. Central to this view is the claim that the consequences of nuclear weapons’ 
use, even in a limited form, would be far-reaching. Nuclear explosions would represent a 
humanitarian catastrophe in the sense that the ensuing impact would be largely 
indiscriminate, long-lasting, and affecting areas well beyond the immediate place of 
detonation.  
 
The humanitarian approach is the next great hope of those committed to the abolition of 
nuclear weapons. It has injected some much-needed enthusiasm into the ranks of nuclear 
abolitionists (Acheson, 2018). In the past few years their activity has concentrated around the 
“Humanitarian Initiative”. The Initiative is a series of formal international gatherings 
sponsored by several states where calls for the legal abolition of nuclear weapons have been 
raised. They initially led to the formulation of the “Humanitarian Pledge” and have 
culminated, thus far, in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) in July 2017. The treaty was a result of speedy negotiations (formally these started 
only in March 2017) because the Pledge paved the way to identify and unite the likeminded 
actors. By accepting, the Pledge countries commit themselves to working towards the 
elimination of nuclear weapons on the grounds of their unacceptable humanitarian 
consequences. In addition to the formal meetings of the Initiative, the adoption of the Pledge, 
and the TPNW, states supporting the humanitarian approach have also succeeded in 
establishing the Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament set up by the United 
Nations General Assembly. The overarching aspiration of the humanitarian approach has 
been well captured by Nick Ritchie and Kjølv Egeland as an effort to ‘resist nuclear 
hegemony through delegitimising nuclear weapons’ (2018: 8). 
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This article analyzes the humanitarian approach and the prospects it offers when dealing with 
the problem of nuclear weapons and by extension the nuclear condition. The analysis is 
grounded in a classical realist perspective. It draws particularly on the emphasis of classical 
realists on the political nature of international problems and the way in which these are 
shaped by considerations of power. Such perspective is especially useful because the 
humanitarian approach attempts to address the political problem of nuclear weapons by 
recourse to claims about morality and through the means of international law, thus 
deliberately choosing to circumvent politics and its concern with power. While this course of 
action is perhaps understandable, it is open to question whether, and if so, how, it takes into 
account the underlying power political realities created by the material possession of nuclear 
weapons. The tension between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states 
when it comes to the abolition of nuclear weapons is a prime example of a conflict between 
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. The realization that none of the nuclear weapon states has 
accepted the humanitarian approach and have been fairly united in their rejection of it will 
probably come as no surprise at all. The classical realist perspective suggests that to overlook 
the power political dimension and to consider the problem of nuclear weapons chiefly as a 
moral and legal issue is likely to lead to yet another failure in efforts to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
The article puts forward and addresses the following three questions. First, it asks what is 
new about the humanitarian approach that might allow us to distinguish it from previous 
attempts to abolish nuclear weapons? If there is no feature in the humanitarian approach that 
might be identified as novel, its contribution will be limited and the chances of its success are 
low. Second, the article asks, why has the humanitarian approach appeared in the current 
historical and political constellation? Understanding the conditions of its rise is crucial to 
identifying the practical political needs that it serves and to considering its further prospects. 
Finally, the article concludes by asking whether the humanitarian approach can reach its 
proclaimed goals. Judgment as to the appropriateness and adequacy of the means is a crucial 
element in evaluating this initiative. 
 
 
The Humanitarian Initiative – What’s new? 
The Humanitarian Initiative is a serious attempt to shift the debate on nuclear weapons. 
Aiming at their eventual abolition, the Initiative has coalesced around a series of conferences 
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on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons organized since 2013. Each of the 
conferences, hosted respectively by the governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria, saw an 
increase in the number of participants from other states as well as from non-governmental 
organizations. At these meetings a broad range of concerns about nuclear weapons and their 
potential use was articulated. The arguments about the catastrophic consequences of the use 
of nuclear weapons for humans and their natural environment have subsequently led to the 
formulation of the Humanitarian Pledge.  
 
The Pledge was initially presented by the government of Austria at the Vienna Conference on 
the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which it organized in the beginning of 
December 2014. Although it was issued as the host-country’s individual declaration, an 
additional 126 countries have since joined it.3 The document served partly as a proclamation 
ahead of the regular 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and partly as a manifesto for future action in the area of nuclear 
disarmament. In line with this two-pronged strategy, its supporters welcomed the vote of the 
United Nations General Assembly, which adopted the Pledge in the form of a resolution at its 
session in December 2015. Thus within one year, the Pledge has gone from an initiative 
launched by a single country to a large international undertaking that commands a 
comfortable majority in the UN General Assembly. In fact, the vote in the General Assembly 
was supported by many more countries than had endorsed the Pledge at the time of the 
voting. 
 
The central objective of the Humanitarian Initiative was to achieve a legal document banning 
and eliminating nuclear weapons (Sauer and Pretorius, 2014). Its goals are most succinctly 
summarized in the concluding paragraph of the Pledge, which declares the aim to ‘stigmatise, 
prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian 
consequences and associated risks’ (Humanitarian Pledge, 2014).4  
 
While the language of the Pledge draws on several formulations stressing the humanitarian 
effects of any potential use of nuclear weapons that were contained in the consensus 
document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, efforts to control nuclear weapons by 
pointing out dangers they represent to humanity predate their very existence. The physicist 
Niels Bohr warned in his July 1944 memorandum to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that in 
the absence of an international agreement to control the new fissile materials any immediate 
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advantage would be ‘outweighed by a perpetual menace to human security’ (Bohr, 1944). A 
decade after the detonation of two nuclear bombs over Japan the humanitarian concerns 
stemming from the use of nuclear weapons were reiterated in the 1955 Russell-Einstein 
Manifesto which gave rise to the Pugwash movement (eventually, in 1995, the Pugwash was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to diminish and eliminate the role of nuclear 
weapons in international politics). The Russell-Einstein Manifesto saw the use of nuclear 
weapons in any new world war as inevitable and consequently called for a peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Importantly, its authors appealed to the notion of common, biological 
needs of the human species. As they famously put it, calling on the decision-makers of their 
time, ‘remember your humanity, and forget the rest’ (Russell and Einstein, 1955).    
 
The Humanitarian Initiative has two other prominent sources of inspiration. First, it builds on 
the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (1996). Although the Court 
found neither the use, the threat of use, nor the possession of nuclear weapons illegal it 
concluded that such actions needed to conform to international humanitarian law with which 
they were generally incompatible, though not under all circumstances. Significantly, the 
Court mentioned explicitly ‘an extreme situation of self-defence, in which the very survival 
of a State would be at stake’ (International Court of Justice, 1996: 44). Nevertheless, the 
advisory opinion gave the adherents of the humanitarian approach a powerful tool with which 
to demand change to the nuclear status quo.  
 
Second, the proponents of the Humanitarian Initiative attempt to model their efforts after the 
success of the international campaigns to ban landmines and cluster munitions, which, in 
their view, produced ‘new standards of appropriate state behaviour’ formulated in 
international, legal documents (Borrie, 2014: 626). The achievement of those campaigns is 
ascribed particularly to the ways in which they reframed particular weapons and how they 
mobilized and managed to bring together states and civil society actors, which then pushed 
their joint agenda in various diplomatic settings. Key to their accomplishment, so the 
proponents argue, was following ‘a principle-based approach’ through the means of which ‘a 
complete weapon system was declared illegal’ (Sauer and Pretorius, 2014: 246). In short, the 
road to success led through a combination of moral and legal arguments, which superseded 
the traditional processes of arms control negotiations, typically restricted to states alone.  
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It remains a question whether landmines or cluster munitions, the two main precedents 
invoked by the proponents of the Humanitarian Initiative, belong to the same category as 
nuclear weapons. One could argue that, while landmines or cluster munitions kill a lot of 
people individually, what sets nuclear weapons apart is the scale and scope on which 
annihilation would occur in entire regions or even worldwide.5 Moreover, in so far as efforts 
to reframe the perception of nuclear weapons are central to the humanitarian approach, one 
also needs to be aware that nuclear weapons are perceived in a very different manner. 
Nobody has ever called landmines or cluster munitions the decisive guarantors of national 
security or the ultimate insurance policy.6 Yet, these are precisely the labels that are 
frequently invoked in various national strategic documents and in public debates about 
spending on nuclear weapons systems. This specific perception, which truly sets nuclear 
weapons apart and which is connected to the physical destructive properties constituting 
them, is what contributes to their distinctive status.  
 
Given the historical precedents, what is then new about the humanitarian approach? As 
already noted, there has been no shortage of moral arguments against nuclear weapons based 
on the awareness of their extremely destructive power. To point out the consequences of 
nuclear weapons’ use and draw moral conclusions is not original. Albert Wohlstetter 
remarked as much in his critique of another attempt that stressed the moral impermissibility 
of nuclear weapons’ use, namely the 1983 pastoral letter of US Catholic bishops 
(Wohlstetter, 2009: 563). 
 
What is, however, novel about the current humanitarian approach is the emphasis on the 
combination of moral and legal arguments contained in the Humanitarian Initiative and the 
TPNW. It presents a moral stance, a rejection of nuclear weapons grounded in the belief in 
the unacceptable, universal consequences of their use, and tries to transform it into an 
absolute principle of international law enshrined in the treaty. In short, the Humanitarian 
Initiative presupposes that a sufficient number of people and states can be convinced about 
the dictates of the humanitarian consequences. Once they accept the moral argument, 
buttressed by the authority of scientific findings about the potential effects of nuclear 
weapons, a legal ban must follow.  
 
The humanitarian approach uses legal arguments in three ways. First, the proponents are 
aware that a legal ban on nuclear weapons will not necessarily lead to nuclear disarmament 
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(Fihn 2017). Some states might obviously choose to stay out of such a treaty, just like there 
still are states that refuse to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. But a legal ban provides, so the argument goes, a crucial element in the 
process of delegitimizing and devaluing nuclear weapons (Sauer and Pretorius, 2014: 248; 
Ritchie 2014). By forging the TPNW a new international standard, a norm, has been adopted, 
and it is now be possible to work towards making this norm universal. The weapons’ 
illegality will allow for their stigmatization.  
 
Second, the argument for a legal ban is an attempt to address the asymmetric power 
relationship between the nuclear ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. By trying to turn the fact of 
possession of nuclear weapons, which is a matter of a political decision and expediency, into 
a matter of legality/illegality, the ‘have-nots’ are moving towards the reversal of the well-
established notion, formulated by E. H. Carr, that ‘insistence on the legal validity of 
international treaties is a weapon used by the ruling nations to maintain their supremacy over 
weaker nations on whom the treaties have been imposed’ (Carr, 1964: 189). The Non-
Proliferation Treaty with its robust enforcement of the nonproliferation norm and the neglect 
of the disarmament provisions of Article VI, both of which favour the nuclear ‘haves’, is an 
excellent example confirming E. H. Carr’s observation. The legal ban on nuclear weapons 
would, however, allow the weaker states to make claims that the possession of nuclear 
weapons is a matter of law. Doing so would, to quote E. H. Carr one more time, ‘exclud[e] 
the factor of power’ (Carr, 1964: 205). Unsurprisingly then, the nuclear weapon states have 
been hostile to the Humanitarian Initiative, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
and the humanitarian approach as a whole. 
 
Finally, and related to the previous point, the legal arguments are used to address a political 
issue, that has been otherwise immune to challenges. Simply put, law is used as an instrument 
in creating a process of political resistance. In the mid-1990s, when the International Court of 
Justice was asked about the legality of the use, the threat of use, or the possession of nuclear 
weapons, some of the nuclear weapon states argued during the hearings that the Court did not 
face a legal question but a political one. While the Court agreed that there were political 
aspects to the case, this acknowledgement did not prevent it from weighing in on the question 
of legality and compatibility of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law. In 
short, the nuclear weapon states must defend themselves, legally and politically, whereas in 
the absence of the humanitarian approach they would not have had to do so. The presence of 
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the United States’ and United Kingdom’s representatives at the Vienna Conference in 2014, 
to voice their countries’ disagreement with the Initiative, was a good illustration. It would 
seem, however, that the liberal democratic nuclear weapon states (except for France, perhaps) 
are more susceptible to the kind of pressure emanating from norms grounded in international 
law than other nuclear possessors, thus potentially limiting the scope of this argument.   
 
Why now? 
Writing on the subject of nuclear disarmament in the early 1980s, George Kennan expressed 
regret over what he perceived as the lost sense of urgency, which characterized the previous 
decades. As he put it:  
 
One senses, even on the part of those who today most accurately perceive the problem 
and are inwardly most exercised about it, a certain discouragement, resignation, 
perhaps even despair, when it comes to the question of raising the subject again. The 
danger is so obvious. So much has already been said. What is to be gained by 
reiteration? What good would it now do? (1982: 175—76) 
 
Kennan delivered these remarks as he was awarded the Albert Einstein Peace Prize. He 
concluded his speech by recalling the Russell-Einstein manifesto’s appeal to remember one’s 
humanity. His address illustrates well the persistent nature of humanitarian concerns about 
nuclear weapons. But the fact that such concerns were voiced in the past only makes more 
prominent the question about the rise of the humanitarian approach in the last few years. Why 
has it become so significant? 
 
The sentiment expressed by Kennan is shared, perhaps even more strongly, among the anti-
nuclear activists today. They frequently decry the public’s lack of awareness of, and interest 
in, nuclear matters. If Kennan thought a sense of urgency was missing in the early 1980s, 
when there were robust, publicly very engaged and visible anti-nuclear protests, he would 
have been stunned by the present-day disinterest in nuclear issues. The possession of nuclear 
weapons and their place in countries’ security policies are firmly entrenched and are not 
exposed to any serious protest or debate. A major decision by the British Parliament in July 
2016, which has given the final go-ahead to the replacement of the United Kingdom’s nuclear 
deterrent for decades to come, was reached after less than a day’s worth of debate in the 
House of Commons. In a typical fashion, the Prime Minister Theresa May invoked the 
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unknown future threats and concluded that ‘it would be an act of gross irresponsibility to lose 
the ability to meet such threats by discarding the ultimate insurance against those risks in the 
future’ (May 2016). A vast majority of the MPs agreed with her. The proponents of the 
renewal did not fail to note that the final decision carried a far greater majority (of 355 votes) 
than the initial vote under the Blair government in December 2006 (a still very comfortable 
majority of 248 votes). 
 
Against this background of contentment with the nuclear possession, which has become 
paradigmatic to all nuclear weapon states, the humanitarian approach is an attempt to 
capitalize on various pronouncements concerning nuclear disarmament that have appeared in 
the last decade. Starting with the January 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed by the so-called 
gang of four (George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn), who have 
called for a world free of nuclear weapons, this trope has been developed further in their 
subsequent writings and echoed by similar groups of former prominent politicians, diplomats, 
and military leaders globally. The vision of the world free of nuclear weapons also received 
endorsement from the US President Barack Obama in his Prague Speech in April 2009. The 
recognition of the humanitarian consequences in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference provided an important formal point of reference, as have various following votes 
in the United Nations General Assembly that have focused more specifically on the 
Humanitarian Initiative. In short, there appeared a rhetorical opening on which the 
humanitarian approach has tried to capitalize (Ritchie 2018). 
 
Despite this range of endorsements of nuclear disarmament, it would be relatively easy to 
dismiss the objectives of the humanitarian approach as unattainable or unrealistic. After all, 
calls for a world free of nuclear weapons are typically wrapped in various caveats and heavily 
conditioned. And there is already some evidence to reach the conclusion that the 
humanitarian approach might fade like all previous attempts. While the nuclear-armed states 
have been paying attention, it would be putting it mildly to say that their reactions have not 
been sympathetic. Indeed, in some cases they have been concerted and hostile, because the 
Humanitarian Initiative not only reminds them of their obligations to disarm (this obligation 
only concerns the five recognized nuclear weapon states that are signatories of the NPT, not 
the other nuclear armed states which remain outside of the nonproliferation treaty), but also 
because it questions their moral choices in the pursuit of their national security policies. 
Resistance to the humanitarian approach is not, however, the sole domain of the nuclear 
 10 
 
10 
weapon states. Their allies have, likewise, been unwilling to endorse the Humanitarian 
Pledge, despite the fact that some among them did support the Joint Statement of the 
Humanitarian Initiative delivered at the NPT Review Conference in April 2015. None of the 
NATO alliance states, for instance, has formally endorsed the Pledge, even though Norway 
sponsored the very first conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in 
2013. In short, the prospects of success are bleak, no matter how much enthusiasm there may 
be among the Initiative’s supporters.  
 
Dismissing the goals of the Humanitarian Initiative as unattainable and unrealistic because of 
the resistance it has encountered would, however, miss the point. The Humanitarian Initiative 
is precisely a result of frustration stemming from the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament 
within the framework of the existing institutions of the nonproliferation regime. While the 
Initiative’s adherents are very careful to stress that their objective is not to undermine these 
institutions, there is a palpable sense that they must be given a new impulse.  
 
Indeed, the Humanitarian Initiative has come to be increasingly seen by many as the only 
possible way of moving forward on nuclear weapons (Johnson, 2015). This is so, because the 
Conference on Disarmament continues to be deadlocked, the 2015 Review Conference of the 
NPT reached no consensus, and the nuclear weapon states keep upgrading their nuclear 
arsenals. Given its decades-long impasse, the Conference on Disarmament has rendered itself 
largely irrelevant, if not outright grotesque, due to the inability to even agree on its agenda, 
let alone make any substantive progress; the 2015 NPT Review Conference lived up to the 
historical pattern where “success” is followed by “failure”. Moreover, the NPT has never 
brought any tangible progress on nuclear disarmament. Viewed from such a perspective, the 
Humanitarian Initiative, fresh off a series of conferences, high-profile motions at the United 
Nations, and capped by the adoption of the TPNW appears to have the momentum that 
manifestly does not exist elsewhere. In fact, the momentum and the buzz that the 
Humanitarian Initiative created were, until the July 2017 conclusion of the TPNW, frequently 
presented as its chief accomplishments (Fihn 2015). It is obviously possible to argue over 
whether this process is much of an achievement. The proponents believe that it is too early to 
tell, and there is a palpable sense of excitement at various venues when the Initiative and the 
TPNW are discussed.  
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The preoccupation with the momentum, however, represents one of the key and probably 
fairly immediate problems facing the Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW. What exactly is 
going to happen as the momentum exhausts itself? The exhaustion is inevitable, because the 
campaign initially enjoyed the advantages of an extensive growth. At some point such a 
mode of growth was bound to meet its limits. While the number of 127 countries that have 
endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge is impressive, it also remains the fact that the count has 
not grown since 2016. Fewer countries (122) voted for the TPNW and it has (as of May 
2018) merely 58 signatories of whom ten states have also ratified the treaty. As the 
momentum slows down, maintaining or regaining it risks becoming the chief objective 
instead of focusing on the actual subject matter of nuclear disarmament. Despite the 
accomplishment of negotiating a nuclear weapons ban treaty, it might be worthwhile to 
consider the parallel with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the ratification of 
which has practically stalled in the last two decades. China or the United States have yet to 
ratify that treaty, while other nuclear-armed states such as India, North Korea and Pakistan 
have not even signed up to it. And yet, the analogy between the CTBT and the Humanitarian 
Initiative is not entirely accurate because the CTBT did establish a norm against nuclear 
weapons’ testing, while it remains the subject of contention whether the TPNW has done 
something similar concerning the possession of nuclear weapons (Highsmith and Stewart 
2018). 
 
The larger argument here is that if the recent growth of the Humanitarian Initiative, including 
the effort to adopt and establish a ban treaty, is a response to the frustration produced by the 
lack of movement towards nuclear disarmament within the current structures, it serves 
precisely as a palliative, but not as a remedy. In turn, if the Initiative is a mere palliative, the 
nuclear weapon states will be content to let it run its course, or even prolong the period 
during which the placebo will be in effect.7 That the latter could become the case is suggested 
not only by the presence of some of the nuclear weapon states at the Humanitarian Initiative 
meeting in Vienna in December 2014, but also by the reluctance of their allies to pursue the 
Initiative fully. For instance, the Australian Foreign Minister Julia Bishop warned before the 
February 2014 conference in Mexico that ‘we must engage, not enrage nuclear countries’ 
(Bishop 2014). This attitude has not disappeared and has, perhaps, become more firmly 
entrenched.  
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Seen in this light, the Humanitarian Initiative might be doing more for the maintenance of the 
status quo than its adherents would probably wish to admit. It creates additional space for 
arguments about the best possible tactics on how quickly to move ahead, what to do and what 
not to do so that some states are not offended or enraged, what preparatory work needs to be 
done, which conditions have to be addressed before substantive progress may be achieved, 
and so on (Patton 2018). There will be plenty of experts to weigh in on these issues, always 
ready to address various political expediencies and argue why it is important and even ethical 
to wait and proceed cautiously.8 In short, the Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW may 
become yet more attributes of the nonproliferation complex.       
 
Can the humanitarian approach work? 
While the Humanitarian Initiative has raised a good deal of enthusiasm, some of its 
proponents surprisingly admit that achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is 
unlikely. They have spent enough time dealing with the nuclear weapon states to have 
developed proclivity for satisfying themselves with minor improvements and initiatives. 
Being engaged in a process tends to be more important than tangible results (Craig and 
Ruzicka 2013). To this end, the humanitarian approach meets the necessary requirements. It 
has created, new venues to rehash the arguments, and new sources of funding. The 
humanitarian approach fits well, paradoxically if one wishes, with the mode of operation of 
the nonproliferation complex.   
 
But there are at least two other, and more significant, reasons that cast doubts over the 
prospects of the Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW. Both of them can be traced to the 
combination of moral and legal claims that the Initiative puts forward and to their universalist 
nature. It is here that the insights of classical realism - especially its emphasis on power, 
scepticism about universalising claims, and concerns about the relationship between law, 
morals and politics - provide a useful analytical perspective. 
 
First, the Humanitarian Initiative disregards states’ relative power considerations and makes 
unwarranted universalist assumptions. The humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear 
weapons are presented as part of the effort to undermine the narrative behind nuclear 
deterrence.9 Emphasizing the humanitarian costs of potential nuclear explosions, deliberate or 
accidental, serves the dual goals of devaluation and stigmatization of nuclear weapons. The 
underlying premise of efforts to devalue and stigmatize is that nuclear weapons have no value 
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of their own, but merely that which is socially ascribed to them. Even if one accepts the 
philosophical grounds of this position, which are not incontestable, in terms of practical 
politics it omits actors’ differentiated power concerns stemming from their relative roles and 
situations. These vary partly according to their specific position within the international 
system (great powers vs. small states, countries in stable vs. unstable regions, etc.) and partly 
as a result of their particular internal political preferences and choices (status quo states vs. 
revisionist states, peaceful vs. aggressive states, etc.). In its universalist zeal, the 
Humanitarian Initiative overlooks the possibility that in a world of pluralistic political actors 
the value of nuclear weapons is relative and likely to differ based on their power and/or 
identity concerns.10 In other words, the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons may be 
identical to all, but no single political response follows from this because the humanitarian 
consequences are only one among many considerations states weigh upon in their process of 
valuation of nuclear weapons.   
 
The relative assessment of value is not, however, the only area in which the proponents of the 
Humanitarian Initiative make a mistake on the basis of their universalist assumptions. The 
same logic of differentiation applies also to actors’ relative willingness to suffer 
stigmatization for going against a dominant norm. In the sphere of nuclear politics the cases 
of the four holdouts from the Nonproliferation Treaty (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan) 
amply demonstrate the point. All have been exposed to some degree of stigmatization, which 
they knew would follow their actions, even though they have not been put under equal 
amounts of pressure. The difference will be readily apparent to anyone who considers the 
treatment received by India and North Korea, respectively. While the former has benefitted 
from inclusion into various international bodies that typically require being a signatory of the 
NPT, the latter has been exposed to decades of international sanctions. Here is not the place 
to judge the relative merits of the varied levels of stigmatization. The difference nevertheless 
drives home two conclusions. First, some states may knowingly choose to suffer 
stigmatization, if they deem it the necessary price to pay for the achievement of other 
objectives, for example status or security that may come with the possession of nuclear 
weapons. Second, the levels of stigmatization itself differ based on the separate 
considerations of those who should carry out stigmatization. In short, stigmatization is not 
only a matter of a moral principle, but of a political decision to enforce a moral principle. As 
such, it may therefore not materialize because of other political considerations.  
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To sum up, elimination of nuclear weapons espoused by the Humanitarian Initiative and the 
TPNW is logically based on two universalist assumptions – 1) the relative value of these 
weapons will come to equal zero among all states; 2) states will wish equally not to be 
stigmatized.11 Both of these assumptions are doubtful so long as the international system of 
sovereign states exists. As we have seen, the different power political considerations and the 
pressures stemming from a state’s position in the international system undermine the two 
assumptions. This is further compounded by the fact that all states will not be 
treated/stigmatized equally by other states, because these states will apply moral principles to 
the extent that it serves, or is compatible with, their politically defined interests and identities. 
 
The second reason that casts a major doubt over the prospects of the Humanitarian Initiative 
stems from its excessive legalism, i.e. the belief that the problem of nuclear weapons can be 
resolved by translating moral principles into legal arguments and instruments, which is 
manifested in the drive towards the TPNW. The problem of nuclear weapons is, however, 
inescapably the problem of their political control. As the classical realists never tired pointing 
out, ‘none of the schemes and devices by which great humanitarians and shrewd politicians 
endeavoured to reorganize the relations between states on the basis of law has stood the trial 
of history’ (Morgenthau, 1962: 282). Central to their critique was the rejection of the notion 
that, in the words of Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘the law, as it really is, can be understood without 
the normative and social context in which it actually stands’ (Morgenthau, 1962: 282). This 
normative and social context is shaped by politics, a relationship which E. H. Carr captured 
particularly pithily: ‘the ultimate authority of law derives from politics’ (Carr, 1964: 180).  
 
The advocates of the Humanitarian Initiative may be celebrating discursive shifts in their 
frequent meetings around the world, but the decisive normative and social contexts are to be 
found in domestic politics, where nuclear decisions are taken, and in the framework of 
international politics, which shapes these decisions. The Initiative’s proponents mistake what 
they take to be a universal moral claim – nuclear weapons must not be used because of their 
inhumane consequences – for a universal political principle that must guide everyone’s 
action. The aforementioned vote in the British Parliament is a fitting example that such a link 
between a moral claim and political action cannot be assumed to exist. A decision in favour 
of nuclear weapons was reached domestically with reference to future uncertainty inherent to 
the international system. An international ban is not going to change such domestic 
calculations and leanings. Those states that deem the value of nuclear weapons to be greater 
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than zero, states which see in these weapons their “ultimate insurance policy” and are willing 
to suffer stigmatization because of the possession, will simply abstain from any such 
agreement, much like they have done with the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, or the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The NPT is 
by far the most universally subscribed to of all of these treaties, yet four nuclear-armed states 
remain outside of it. To recall Morgenthau once more, ‘a rule of international law does not 
(...) receive its validity from its enactment into a legal instrument, such as an international 
treaty’ (Morgenthau, 1962: 298). Law needs to be maintained by compatible interests or a 
balance of power, either of which would ensure that rules will be enforced.  
 
There is a strong inclination among the advocates of the Humanitarian Initiative to believe 
that its success is a matter of a better argument and a proper understanding of the issue. One 
of the leaders of the cause, Austrian diplomat Alexander Kmentt, expressed the belief in the 
following way: ‘The more the world understands about the global humanitarian consequences 
of nuclear weapons, the stronger the case against them becomes. Viewed against such a 
background, nuclear weapons are not reconcilable with a 21st-century understanding of 
international law and, in particular, international humanitarian law’ (Kmentt, 2013). There 
could hardly be a better expression of legalism, which Judith Shklar identified as a ‘belief 
that law is not only separate from political life but that it is a mode of social action superior to 
mere politics’ (Shklar, 1986: 8). 
 
A political theorist, Shklar was not per se interested in international relations.12 But she fully 
recognized that the most damning indictment of legalism predating her own devastating 
critique of it came from the classical realists in the study of international politics. Her 
contribution is important because it demonstrates how, despite giving the semblance of 
action, legalism leads to political inertia as a result of its rejection of politics: ‘To subdue this 
irrational political world it becomes all the more necessary to insist on a policy of 
uncompromising rules and rule following’ (Shklar, 1986: 122). This is precisely the direction 
that the humanitarian approach has taken with its turn to the Humanitarian Pledge and the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It insists ever more strongly on rules that will 
somehow rid the world of nuclear weapons, while ignoring the political, social, and 
normative contexts which prompt countries to opt for the possession of nuclear weapons. It 
may be true, as the proponents of the ban proclaim, that nuclear weapons are the only type of 
weapons of mass destruction not yet legally prohibited. But, and this is a crucial point, it does 
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not follow that the existence of a legal ban would lead all actors to act politically in an 
identical manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The humanitarian approach clearly contains emancipatory ambitions and its combination of 
moral and legal arguments, though not without historical precedents, is innovative. But its 
proponents would do well to heed the scepticism and wisdom of classical realism when it 
comes to encounters between morality, international law and international politics. From a 
classical realist perspective, the danger here is obvious. Instead of doing something about 
nuclear disarmament, diplomats, international lawyers, and the global civil society will spend 
the foreseeable future discussing whether nuclear weapons are or are not compatible with 
international humanitarian law and debating fine intricacies of the ban treaty along with its 
legal relationship to other cornerstones of the global nuclear order. In the meantime, nuclear 
weapon states will carry on with the ongoing upgrades of their nuclear arsenals. In the eyes of 
some observers, engaging in a lengthy, seemingly endless process (remember that the UN 
working group on nuclear disarmament is called ‘open-ended’) might be a good enough 
result. It will keep the question of nuclear disarmament alive, while reinjecting it with some 
enthusiasm, hope and purpose, with visions of what could be. And yet the process itself is 
unlikely to achieve the proclaimed goal of nuclear abolition. This is so, because the legalistic 
argument, which follows from the claims about the moral unacceptability of nuclear 
weapons, reinforces the current structure of international politics. It is sovereign states that 
are signatories of the TPNW and that have to ratify it. It is states that it aims at first and 
foremost. As Shklar persuasively argued, not only is law inherently conservative, even when 
used for supposedly progressive purposes, but also legalism, as a political ideology, 
constitutes a ‘defense of the status quo’ (Shklar, 1986: 135). The humanitarian approach 
clearly wishes to change the nuclear status quo, but in doing so it ignores the political 
conditions and realities that have produced current nuclear order in the first place. It is 
precisely the international structure comprising sovereign states that has led humanity toward 
the nuclear condition. The attempt to draw states into a process centred around the legal 
prohibition of nuclear weapons is fraught with the danger of the process being dominated by 
states’ interests that will override the humanitarian imperatives. Already, there are tensions 
and warnings not to proceed too far, too quickly, because some states might get upset and 
abandon the initiative as too radical. But, any effort that would address the nuclear condition 
has to be radical, given the revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons. 
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Notes 
1. Since the late 1980s, there has been a decline in the number of nuclear warheads held 
and deployed by the nuclear weapon states. While in absolute terms the overall 
number has decreased significantly, it is meaningless in terms of their destructive 
power and consequences their use would have for humankind and the planet. 
2. These actors have come together chiefly under the umbrella of the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which was the recipient of the 2017 
Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to ban nuclear weapons.   
3. For an up-to-date list of the countries endorsing the Pledge see the website maintained 
by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons - 
http://www.icanw.org/pledge/ (accessed 25 May 2018). 
4. The 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document stated the member parties’ ‘deep 
concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these 
weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would 
result from the use of nuclear weapons.’ See 2010 Review Conference Final 
Document, Volume I, p. 12, available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I
) (accessed 25 May 2018). 
5. This argument has, of course, long been central to the case made by the proponents of 
nuclear deterrence. The awareness of high costs of the use of nuclear weapons, 
perhaps even in the ultimate form of the destruction of the planet, is what leads the 
proponents to believe that their possessors will be particularly hesitant to use them. In 
other words, the adherents of nuclear deterrence would not dispute the effects of the 
use of nuclear weapons. Such knowledge is indispensable to the belief in nuclear 
deterrence. However, they draw fundamentally different conclusions from the 
knowledge of the weapons’ destructive power. 
6. I would like to thank Ken Booth for raising this point. 
7. As Campbell Craig and I have argued, there will also continue to be a powerful 
institutional interest within the nonproliferation complex to keep the Humanitarian 
Initiative going, because it further justifies the existence of its constituent parts. See 
Craig and Ruzicka (2013).   
8. For examples of precisely such pieces that give some credit to the Humanitarian 
Initiative in principle, but question whether now is the right time to proceed on its 
goals or cast doubt over the TPNW see Heather Williams (2016) and Scott Sagan and 
Benjamin A. Valentino (2017). 
9. I leave aside the belief of its proponents that nuclear deterrence works because of the 
unacceptable costs it would impose on those suffering from nuclear explosions. 
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Whether or not this belief is warranted, is an important question. But the argument I 
present works irrespective of how this particular question is answered. 
10. The relative value of nuclear weapons is the reason why among states capable of 
building them some do and some don’t. 
11. There is obviously the possibility that some actors could place a greater than zero 
value on nuclear weapons but they would still be coerced into being non-nuclear 
weapon states. 
12. Kamila Stullerova (2016) clearly demonstrates the connection between Shklar and the 
classical realists. 
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